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I. LONG-TERM TRENDS  
IN NATURE AND SOCIETY 
 
1 
Mathematical Modeling of Biological and 
Social Evolutionary Macrotrends* 
 
Leonid E. Grinin, Alexander V. Markov,  
and Andrey V. Korotayev 
 
Abstract 
In the first part of this article we survey general similarities and differences 
between biological and social macroevolution. In the second (and main) part, 
we consider a concrete mathematical model capable of describing important 
features of both biological and social macroevolution. In mathematical models 
of historical macrodynamics, a hyperbolic pattern of world population growth 
arises from non-linear, second-order positive feedback between demographic 
growth and technological development. Based on diverse paleontological data 
and an analogy with macrosociological models, we suggest that the hyperbolic 
character of biodiversity growth can be similarly accounted for by non-linear, 
second-order positive feedback between diversity growth and the complexity of 
community structure. We discuss how such positive feedback mechanisms can 
be modelled mathematically. 
Keywords: social evolution, biological evolution, mathematical model, bio-
diversity, population growth, positive feedback, hyperbolic growth. 
Introduction 
The present article represents an attempt to move further in our research on the 
similarities and differences between social and biological evolution (see Grinin, 
Markov et al. 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2012). We have endeavored to make  
a systematic comparison between biological and social evolution at different 
levels of analysis and in various aspects. We have formulated a considerable 
number of general principles and rules of evolution, and worked to develop  
a common terminology to describe some key processes in biological and social 
evolution. In particular, we have introduced the notion of ‘social aromorphosis’ 
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to describe the process of widely diffused social innovation that enhances the 
complexity, adaptability, integrity, and interconnectedness of a society or social 
system (Grinin, Markov et al. 2008, 2009a, 2009b). This work has convinced 
us that it might be possible to find mathematical models that can describe im-
portant features of both biological and social macroevolution. In the first part of 
this article we survey general similarities and differences between the two types 
of macroevolution. In the second (and main) part, we consider a concrete math-
ematical model that we deem capable of describing important features of both 
biological and social macroevolution. 
The comparison of biological and social evolution is an important but (un-
fortunately) understudied subject. Students of culture still vigorously debate the 
applicability of Darwinian evolutionary theory to social/cultural evolution. Un-
fortunately, the result is largely a polarization of views. On the one hand, there 
is a total rejection of Darwin's theory of social evolution (see, e.g., Hallpike 
1986). On the other hand, there are arguments that cultural evolution demon-
strates all of the key characteristics of Darwinian evolution (Mesoudi et al. 
2006). 
We believe that, instead of following the outdated objectivist principle of 
‘either – or’, we should concentrate on the search for methods that could allow 
us to apply the achievements of evolutionary biology to understanding social 
evolution and vice versa. In other words, we should search for productive gen-
eralizations and analogies for the analysis of evolutionary mechanisms in both 
contexts. The Universal Evolution approach aims for the inclusion of all mega-
evolution within a single paradigm (discussed in Grinin, Carneiro, et al. 2011). 
Thus, this approach provides an effective means by which to address the above-
mentioned task. 
It is not only systems that evolve, but also mechanisms of evolution (see 
Grinin, Markov, and Korotayev 2008). Each sequential phase of macroevolu-
tion is accompanied by the emergence of new evolutionary mechanisms. Cer-
tain prerequisites and preadaptations can, therefore, be detected within the pre-
vious phase, and the development of new mechanisms does not invalidate the 
evolutionary mechanisms that were active during earlier phases. As a result, one 
can observe the emergence of a complex system of interaction composed of the 
forces and mechanisms that work together to shape the evolution of new forms. 
Biological organisms operate in the framework of certain physical, chemi-
cal and geological laws. Likewise, the behaviors of social systems and people 
have certain biological limitations (naturally, in addition to various social-
structural, historical, and infrastructural limitations). From the standpoint of 
Universal Evolution, new forms of evolution that determine phase transitions 
may result from activities going in different directions. Some forms that are 
similar in principle may emerge at breakthrough points, but may also result in 
evolutionary dead-ends. For example, social forms of life emerged among 
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many biological phyla and classes, including bacteria, insects, birds, and 
mammals. Among insects, in particular, one finds rather highly developed 
forms of socialization (see, e.g., Robson and Traniello 2002; Ryabko and Rez-
nikova 2009; Reznikova 2011). Yet, despite the seemingly common trajectory 
and interrelation of social behaviors among these various life forms, the im-
pacts that each have had on the Earth are remarkably different. 
Further, regarding information transmission mechanisms, it appears possi-
ble to speak about certain ‘evolutionary freaks’. Some of these mechanisms 
were relatively widespread in the biological evolution of simple organisms, but 
later became less so. Consider, for example, the horizontal exchange of genetic 
information (genes) among microorganisms, which makes many useful genetic 
‘inventions’ available in a sort of ‘commons’ for microbe communities. Among 
bacteria, the horizontal transmission of genes contributes to the rapid develop-
ment of antibiotic resistance (e.g., Markov and Naymark 2009). By contrast, 
this mechanism of information transmission became obsolete or was trans-
formed into highly specialized mechanisms (e.g., sexual reproduction) in the 
evolution of more complex organisms. Today, horizontal transmission is mostly 
confined to the simplest forms of life. 
These examples suggest that an analysis of the similarities and differences 
between the mechanisms of biological and social evolution may help us to un-
derstand the general principles of megaevolution1 in a much fuller way. These 
similarities and differences may also reveal the driving forces and supra-phase 
mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that operate in two or more phases) of megaevo-
lution. One of our previous articles was devoted to the analysis of one such 
mechanism: aromorphosis, the process of widely diffused social innovation that 
enhances the complexity, adaptability, integrity, and interconnectedness of a so-
ciety or social system (Grinin, Markov, and Korotayev 2011; see also Grinin and 
Korotayev 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Grinin, Markov, and Korotayev 2009a, 2009b). 
It is important to carefully compare the two types of macroevolution (i.e., 
biological and social) at various levels and in various aspects. This is necessary 
because such comparisons often tend to be incomplete and deformed by con-
ceptual extremes. These limitations are evident, for example, in the above-
referenced paper by Mesoudi et al. (2006), which attempts to apply a Darwin-
ian method to the study of social evolution. Unfortunately, a failure to recog-
nize or accept important differences between biological and social evolution 
reduces the overall value of the method that these authors propose. Christopher 
Hallpike's rather thorough monograph, Principles of Social Evolution (1986), 
provides another illustration of these limitations. Here, Hallpike offers a fairly 
complete analysis of the similarities and differences between social and bio-
                                                          
1 We denote as megaevolution all the process of evolution throughout the whole of Big History, 
whereas we denote as macroevolution the process of evolution during one of its particular phases. 
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logical organisms, but does not provide a clear and systematic comparison be-
tween social and biological evolution. In what follows, we hope to avoid simi-
lar pitfalls. 
Biological and Social Evolution: A Comparison at Various 
Levels 
There are a few important differences between biological and social macroevo-
lution. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a number of fundamental similari-
ties, including at least three basic sets of shared factors. First, we are discussing 
very complex, non-equilibrium, but stable systems whose function and evolu-
tion can be described by General Systems Theory, as well as by a number of 
cybernetic principles and laws. Second, we are not dealing with isolated sys-
tems, but with the complex interactions between organisms and their external 
environments. As a result, the reactions of systems to ‘external’ challenges can 
be described in terms of general principles that express themselves within 
a biological reality and a social reality. Third (and finally), a direct ‘genetic’ 
link exists between the two types of macroevolution and their mutual influence. 
We believe that the laws and forces driving the biological and social phas-
es of Big History can be comprehended more effectively if we apply the con-
cept of biological and social aromorphosis (Grinin, Markov, and Korotayev 
2011). There are some important similarities between the evolutionary algo-
rithms of biological and social aromorphoses. Thus, it has been noticed that  
the basis of biological aromorphosis 
is usually formed by some partial evolutionary change that... creates sig-
nificant advantages for an organism, puts it in more favorable conditions 
for reproduction, multiplies its numbers and its changeability..., thus ac-
celerating the speed of its further evolution. In those favorable condi-
tions, the total restructurization of the whole organization takes place af-
terwards (Shmal'gauzen 1969: 410; see also Severtsov 1987: 64–76). 
During the course of adaptive radiation, such changes in organization dif-
fuse more or less widely (frequently with significant variations). 
A similar pattern is observed within social macroevolution. An example is 
the invention and diffusion of iron metallurgy. Iron production was practiced 
sporadically in the 3rd millennium BCE, but regular production of low-grade 
steel did not begin until the mid-2nd millennium BCE in Asia Minor (see, e.g., 
Chubarov 1991: 109). At this point, the Hittite kingdom guarded its monopoly 
over the new technology. The diffusion of iron technology led to revolutionary 
changes in different spheres of life, including a significant advancement in 
plough agriculture and, consequently, in the agrarian system as a whole (Grinin 
and Korotayev 2006); an intensive development of crafts; an increase in urban-
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ism; the formation of new types of militaries, armed with relatively cheap but 
effective iron weapons; and the emergence of significantly more developed 
systems of taxation, as well as information collection and processing systems, 
that were necessary to support these armies (e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2007a, 
2007b). Ironically, by introducing cheaply made weapons and other tools into 
the hands of people who might resist the Hittite state, this aromorphosis not 
only supported the growth of that kingdom, it also laid the groundwork for his-
torical phase shifts. 
Considering such cases through the lens of aromorphosis has helped us to 
detect a number of regularities and rules that appear to be common to biological 
and social evolution (Grinin, Markov, and Korotayev 2011). Such rules and 
regularities (e.g., payment for arogenic progress, special conditions for the 
emergence of aromorphosis, etc.) are similar for both biological and social 
macroevolution. It is important to emphasize, however, that similarity between 
the two types of macroevolution does not imply commonality. Rather, signifi-
cant similarities are frequently accompanied by enormous differences. For ex-
ample, the genomes of chimpanzees and the humans are 98 per cent similar, yet 
there are enormous intellectual and social differences between chimpanzees and 
humans that arise from the apparently ‘insignificant’ variations between the 
two genomes (see Markov and Naymark 2009). 
Despite its aforementioned limitations, it appears reasonable to continue 
the comparison between the two types of macroevolution following the analysis 
offered by Hallpike (1986). Therefore, it may prove useful to revisit the perti-
nent observations of this analysis here. Table 1 summarizes the similarities and 
differences that Hallpike (1986: 33–34) finds between social and biological 
organisms. 
While we do not entirely agree with all of his observations – for example, 
the establishment of colonies could be seen as a kind of social reproduction 
akin to organic reproduction – we do feel that Hallpike comes to a sound con-
clusion: that similarities between social and biological organisms are, in gen-
eral, determined by similarities in organization and structure (we would say 
similarities between different types of systems). As a result, Hallpike believes 
that one can use certain analogies in which institutions are similar to some or-
gans. In this way, cells may be regarded as similar to individuals, central gov-
ernment similar to the brain, and so on. Examples of this kind of thinking can 
be found in the classic texts of social theory (see, e.g., Spencer 1898 and Durk-
heim 1991 [1893]), as well as in more recent work (see, e.g., Heylighen 2011). 
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Table 1. Similarities and differences between social and biological 
organisms, as described by Hallpike (1986) 
Similarities Differences 
Social institutions are interrelated in a man-
ner analogous to the organs of the body. 
Individual societies do not have clear 
boundaries. For example, two societies 
may be distinct politically, but not cul-
turally or religiously. 
Despite changes in membership, social 
institutions maintain continuity, as do 
biological organs when individual cells 
are replaced. 
Unlike organic cells, the individuals 
within a society have agency and are 
capable of learning from experience. 
The social division of labor is analogous 
to the specialization of organic functions.
Social structure and function are far less 
closely related than in organic structure 
and function. 
Self-maintenance and feedback processes 
characterize both kinds of system. 
Societies do not reproduce. Cultural 
transmission between generations can-
not be distinguished from the processes 
of system maintenance. 
Adaptive responses to the physical envi-
ronment characterize both kinds of sys-
tem. 
Societies are more mutable than organ-
isms, displaying a capacity for meta-
morphosis only seen in organic phylog-
eny. 
The trade, communication, and other 
transmission processes that characterize 
social systems are analogous to the proc-
esses that transmit matter, energy, and 
information in biological organisms. 
Societies are not physical entities, rather 
their individual members are linked by 
information bonds. 
When comparing biological species and societies, Hallpike (1986: 34) sin-
gles out the following similarities: 
(1) that, like societies, species do not reproduce, 
(2) that both have phylogenies reflecting change over time, and 
(3) that both are made up of individuals who compete against one another. 
Importantly, he also indicates the following difference: ‘[S]ocieties are or-
ganized systems, whereas species are simply collections of individual organ-
isms’ (Hallpike 1986: 34). 
Hallpike tries to demonstrate that, because of the differences between bio-
logical and social organisms, the very idea of natural selection does not appear 
to apply to social evolution. However, we do not find his proofs very convinc-
ing on this account, although they do make sense in certain respects. Further, 
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his analysis is confined mainly to the level of the individual organism and the 
individual society. He rarely considers interactions at the supra-organism level 
(though he does, of course, discuss the evolution of species). His desire to dem-
onstrate the sterility of Darwinian theory to discussions of social evolution not-
withstanding, it seems that Hallpike involuntarily highlights the similarity be-
tween biological and social evolution. As he, himself, admits, the analogy  
between the biological organism and society is quite noteworthy. 
Just as he fails to discuss interactions and developments at the level of the 
supra-organism in great detail, Hallpike does not take into account the point in 
social evolution where new supra-societal developments emerge (up to the lev-
el of the emergence of the World System [e.g., Korotayev 2005, 2007, 2008, 
2012; Grinin and Korotayev 2009b]). We contend that it is very important to 
consider not only evolution at the level of a society but also at the level above 
individual societies, as well as the point at which both levels are interconnected. 
The supra-organism level is very important to understanding biological evolution, 
though the differences between organisms and societies make the importance of 
this supra-level to understanding social evolution unclear. Thus, it might be more 
productive to compare societies with ecosystems rather than with organisms or 
species. However, this would demand the development of special methods, as it 
would be necessary to consider the society not as a social organism, but as a part 
of a wider system, which includes the natural and social environment (cf., Leke-
vičius 2009, 2011). 
In our own analysis, we seek to build on the observations of Hallpike 
while, at the same time, providing a bit more nuance and different scales of 
analysis. Viewing each as a process involving selection (natural, social, or 
both), we identify the differences between social and biological evolution at the 
level of the individual biological organism and individual society, as well as at 
the supra-organismic and supra-societal level. 
Natural and Social Selection 
Biological evolution is more additive (cumulative) than substitutive. Put an-
other way: the new is added to the old. By contrast, social evolution (especially 
over the two recent centuries) is more substitutive than additive: the new re-
places the old (Grinin, Markov et al. 2008, 2011). 
Further, the mechanisms that control the emergence, fixation, and diffusion 
of evolutionary breakthroughs (aromorphoses) differ between biological and 
social evolution. These differences lead to long-term restructuring in the size 
and complexity of social organisms. Unlike biological evolution, where some 
growth of complexity is also observed, social reorganization becomes continu-
ous. In recent decades, societies that do not experience a constant and signifi-
cant evolution look inadequate and risk extinction. 
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In addition, the size of societies (and systems of societies) tends to grow 
constantly through more and more tightly integrative links (this trend has be-
come especially salient in recent millennia), whereas the trend towards increase 
in the size of biological organisms in nature is rather limited and far from gen-
eral. At another level of analysis, one can observe the formation of special su-
prasocietal systems that also tend to grow in size. This is one of the results of 
social evolution and serves as a method of aromorphosis fixation and diffusion. 
The Individual Biological Organism and the Individual Society 
It is very important to note that, although biological and social organisms are 
significantly (actually ‘systemically’) similar, they are radically different in 
their capacities to evolve. For example, as indicated by Hallpike (see above), 
societies are capable of rapid evolutionary metamorphoses that were not ob-
served in the pre-human organic world. In biological evolution, the characteris-
tics acquired by an individual are not inherited by its offspring; thus, they do 
not influence the very slow process of change. 
There are critical differences in how biological and social information are 
transmitted during the process of evolution. Social systems are not only capable 
of rapid transformation, they are also able to borrow innovations and new ele-
ments from other societies. Social systems may also be transformed con-
sciously and with a certain purpose. Such characteristics are absent in natural 
biological evolution. 
The biological organism does not evolve by itself: evolution may only take 
place at a higher level (e.g., population, species, etc.). By contrast, social evolu-
tion can often be traced at the level of the individual social organism (i.e., soci-
ety). Moreover, it is frequently possible to trace the evolution of particular in-
stitutions and subsystems within a social organism. In the process of social evo-
lution the same social organism or institution may experience radical transfor-
mation more than once. 
The Supra-organic and Supra-societal Level 
Given the above-mentioned differences, within the process of social evolution 
we observe the formation of two types of special supra-societal entity:  
(1) amalgamations of societies with varieties of complexity that have analogues 
in biological evolution, and (2) elements and systems that do not belong to any 
particular society and lack many analogues in biological evolution. 
The first type of amalgamation is rather typical, not only in social but also 
in biological evolution. There is, however, a major difference between the two 
kinds of evolution. Any large society usually consists of a whole hierarchy of 
social systems. For example, a typical agrarian empire might include nuclear 
families, extended families, clan communities, village communities, primary 
districts, secondary districts, and provinces, each operating with their own rules 
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of interaction but at the same time interconnected. This kind of supra-societal 
amalgamation can hardly be compared with a single biological organism 
(though both systems can still be compared functionally, as is correctly noted 
by Hallpike [1986]). Within biological evolution, amalgamations of organisms 
with more than one level of organization (as found in a pack or herd) are usu-
ally very unstable and are especially unstable among highly organized animals. 
Of course, analogues do exist within the communities of some social animals 
(e.g., social insects, primates). Neither should we forget that scale is important: 
while we might compare a society with an individual biological organism, we 
must also consider groups of organisms bound by cooperative relationships 
(see, e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1996; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). Such groups 
are quite common among bacteria and even among viruses. These caveats 
aside, it remains the case that within social evolution, one observes the emer-
gence of more and more levels: from groups of small sociums to humankind as 
a whole. 
The multiplication of these levels rapidly produces the second kind of 
amalgamation. It is clear that the level of analysis is very important for com-
parison of biological and social evolution. Which systems should be compared? 
Analogues appear to be more frequent when a society (a social organism) is 
compared to a biological organism or species. However, in many cases, it may 
turn out to be more productive to compare societies with other levels of the 
biota's systemic organization. This might entail comparisons with populations, 
ecosystems and communities; with particular structural elements or blocks of 
communities (e.g., with particular fragments of trophic networks or with par-
ticular symbiotic complexes); with colonies; or with groups of highly organized 
animals (e.g., cetaceans, primates, and other social mammals or termites, ants, 
bees and other social insects). 
Thus, here we confront a rather complex and rarely studied methodological 
problem: which levels of biological and social process are most congruent? 
What are the levels whose comparison could produce the most interesting re-
sults? In general, it seems clear that such an approach should not be a mechani-
cal equation of ‘social organism = biological organism’ at all times and in every 
situation. The comparisons should be operational and instrumental. This means 
that we should choose the scale and level of social and biological phenomena, 
forms, and processes that are adequate for and appropriate to our intended 
comparisons. 
Again, it is sometimes more appropriate to compare a society with an indi-
vidual biological organism, whereas in other cases it could well be more appro-
priate to compare the society with a community, a colony, a population, or 
a species. At yet another scale, as we will see below, in some cases it appears 
rather fruitful to compare the evolution of the biosphere with the evolution of 
the anthroposphere. 
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Mathematical Modeling of Biological and  
Social Macroevolution 
The authors of this article met for the first time in 2005, in the town of Dubna 
(near Moscow), at what seems to have been the first ever international conference 
dedicated specifically to Big History studies. Without advance knowledge of one 
another, we found ourselves in a single session. During the course of the session, 
we presented two different diagrams. One illustrated population dynamics in 
China between 700 BCE and 1851 CE, the other illustrated the dynamics of ma-
rine Phanerozoic biodiversity over the past 542 million years (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Similarity between the long-term population dynamics of Chi-
na (top: millions of people, following Korotayev, Malkov, et al. 
2006b: 47–88) and the dynamics of Phanerozoic marine bio-
diversity (bottom: number of genera, N, following Markov and 
Korotayev 2007) 
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The similarity between the two diagrams was striking. This, despite the fact 
that they depicted the development of very different systems (human popula-
tion vs. biota) at different time scales (hundreds of years vs. millions of years), 
and had been generated using the methods of different sciences (historical de-
mography vs. paleontology) with different sources (demographic estimates vs. 
paleontological data). What could have caused similarity of developmental dy-
namics in very different systems? 
*   *   * 
In 1960, von Foerster et al. published a striking discovery in the journal 
Science. They showed that between 1 and 1958 CE, the world's population (N) 
dynamics could be described in an extremely accurate way with an astonish-
ingly simple equation:2 
   
)( 0 tt
CN t 
,                                         (Eq. 1) 
where Nt is the world population at time t, and C and t0 are constants, with t0 
corresponding to an absolute limit (‘singularity’ point) at which N would be-
come infinite. Parameter t0 was estimated by von Foerster and his colleagues as 
2026.87, which corresponds to November 13, 2026; this made it possible for 
them to supply their article with a title that was a public-relations masterpiece: 
‘Doomsday: Friday, 13 November, A.D. 2026’. 
Of course, von Foerster and his colleagues did not imply that the world 
population on that day could actually become infinite. The real implication was 
that the world population growth pattern that operated for many centuries prior 
to 1960 was about to end and be transformed into a radically different pattern. 
This prediction began to be fulfilled only a few years after the ‘Doomsday’ 
paper was published as World System growth (and world population growth in 
particular) began to diverge more and more from the previous blow-up regime. 
Now no longer hyperbolic, the world population growth pattern is closer to 
a logistic one (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2006a; Korotayev 2009). 
Fig. 2 presents the overall correlation between the curve generated by von 
Foerster et al.'s equation and the most detailed series of empirical estimates of 
world population (McEvedy and Jones 1978, for the period 1000–1950; U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 2013, for 1950–1970). The formal characteristics are:  
R = 0.998; R2 = 0.996; p = 9.4 × 10–17 ≈ 1 × 10–16. For readers unfamiliar with 
mathematical statistics: R2 can be regarded as a measure of the fit between  
                                                          




. However, as von Hoerner (1975) and Kapitza (1999) showed, it can be 
simplified as 
tt
CN t  0
. 
Modeling of Biological and Social Macrotrends 20 
the dynamics generated by a mathematical model and the empirically observed 
situation, and can be interpreted as the proportion of the variation accounted for 
by the respective equation. Note that 0.996 also can be expressed as 99.6 %.3 
Thus, von Foerster et al.'s equation accounts for an astonishing 99.6 % of all 
the macrovariation in world population, from 1000 CE through 1970, as esti-
mated by McEvedy and Jones (1978) and the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(2013).4 Note also that the empirical estimates of world population find them-
selves aligned in an extremely neat way along the hyperbolic curve, which con-
vincingly justifies the designation of the pre-1970s world population growth 
pattern as ‘hyperbolic’. 
 
Fig. 2. Correlation between empirical estimates of world population 
(black, in millions of people, 1000–1970) and the curve gen-
erated by von Foerster et al.'s equation (grey)  
                                                          
3 The second characteristic (p, standing for ‘probability’) is a measure of the correlation's statistical 
significance. A bit counter-intuitively, the lower the value of p, the higher the statistical signifi-
cance of the respective correlation. This is because p indicates the probability that the observed 
correlation could be accounted solely by chance. Thus, p = 0.99 indicates an extremely low statis-
tical significance, as it means that there are 99 chances out of 100 that the observed correlation is 
the result of a coincidence, and, thus, we can be quite confident that there is no systematic rela-
tionship (at least, of the kind that we study) between the two respective variables. On the other 
hand, p = 1 × 10–16 indicates an extremely high statistical significance for the correlation, as it 
means that there is only one chance out of 10,000,000,000,000,000 that the observed correlation 
is the result of pure coincidence (a correlation is usually considered statistically significant once  
p < 0.05). 
4 In fact, with slightly different parameters (С = 164890.45; t0 = 2014) the fit (R2) between the 
dynamics generated by von Foerster's equation and the macrovariation of world population for 
1000–1970 CE as estimated by McEvedy and Jones (1978) and the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(2013) reaches 0.9992 (99.92 %); for 500 BCE – 1970 CE this fit increases to 0.9993 (99.93 %) 
with the following parameters: С = 171042.78; t0 = 2016.  
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The von Foerster et al.'s equation, 
tt
CN t  0
, is the solution for the fol-





dN 2 . 
(Eq. 2) 
This equation can be also written as:  
2aN
dt
dN  , (Eq. 3)
where 
C
a 1 .  
What is the meaning of this mathematical expression? In our context, dN/dt 
denotes the absolute population growth rate at a certain moment in time. Hence, 
this equation states that the absolute population growth rate at any moment in 
time should be proportional to the square of world population at this moment. 
This significantly demystifies the problem of hyperbolic growth. To explain 
this hyperbolic growth, one need only explain why for many millennia the 
world population's absolute growth rate tended to be proportional to the square 
of the population. 
The main mathematical models of hyperbolic growth in the world popula-
tion (Taagapera 1976, 1979; Kremer 1993; Cohen 1995; Podlazov 2004; Tsirel 
2004; Korotayev 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012; Korotayev, Malkov et al. 
2006a: 21–36; Golosovsky 2010; Korotayev and Malkov 2012) are based on 
the following two assumptions: 
(1) ‘the Malthusian (Malthus 1978 [1798]) assumption that population is 
limited by the available technology, so that the growth rate of population 
is proportional to the growth rate of technology’ (Kremer 1993: 681–
682),5 and 
(2) the idea that ‘[h]igh population spurs technological change because it 
increases the number of potential inventors… In a larger population there 
will be proportionally more people lucky or smart enough to come up with 
new ideas’, thus, ‘the growth rate of technology is proportional to total 
population’(Kremer 1993: 685).6  
Here Kremer uses the main assumption of Endogenous Technological 
Growth theory (see, e.g., Kuznets 1960; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion 
                                                          
5 In addition to this, the absolute growth rate is proportional to the population itself. With a given 
relative growth rate, a larger population will increase more in absolute number than a smaller one. 
6 Note that ‘the growth rate of technology’ here means the relative growth rate (i.e., the level to 
which technology will grow in a given unit of time in proportion to the level observed at the be-
ginning of this period). 
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and Howitt 1998; Simon 1977, 2000; Komlos and Nefedov 2002; Jones 1995, 
2005). 
The first assumption looks quite convincing. Indeed, throughout most of 
human history the world population was limited by the technologically deter-
mined ceiling of the carrying capacity of land. For example, with foraging sub-
sistence technologies the Earth could not support more than 8 million people 
because the amount of naturally available useful biomass on this planet is lim-
ited. The world population could only grow over this limit when people started 
to apply various means to artificially increase the amount of available biomass 
that is with the transition from foraging to food production. Extensive agricul-
ture is also limited in terms of the number of people that it can support. Thus, 
further growth of the world population only became possible with the intensifi-
cation of agriculture and other technological improvements (see, e.g., Turchin 
2003; Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2006a, 2006b; Korotayev and Khaltourina 
2006). However, as is well known, the technological level is not constant, but 
variable (see, e.g., Grinin 2007a, 2007b, 2012), and in order to describe its dy-
namics the second basic assumption is employed. 
As this second supposition was, to our knowledge, first proposed by Simon 
Kuznets (1960), we shall denote the corresponding type of dynamics as ‘Kuz-
netsian’. (The systems in which the Kuznetsian population-technological dy-
namics are combined with Malthusian demographic dynamics will be denoted 
as ‘Malthusian-Kuznetsian’.) In general, we find this assumption rather plausi-
ble – in fact, it is quite probable that, other things being equal, within a given 
period of time, five million people will make approximately five times more 
inventions than one million people. 
This assumption was expressed mathematically by Kremer in the following 
way: 
   .kNTdt
dT 
                                          
(Eq. 4) 
This equation simply says that the absolute technological growth rate at 
a given moment in time (dT/dt) is proportional to the technological level (T) 
observed at this moment (the wider the technological base, the higher the num-
ber of inventions that can be made on its basis). On the other hand, this growth 
rate is also proportional to the population (N): the larger the population, the 
larger the number of potential inventors.7 
When united in one system, Malthusian and Kuznetsian equations account 
quite well for the hyperbolic growth of the world population observed before 
the early 1990s (see, e.g., Korotayev 2005, 2007, 2008, 2012; Korotayev, 
Malkov, et al. 2006a). The resultant models provide a rather convincing expla-
                                                          
7 Kremer did not test this hypothesis empirically in a direct way. Note, however, that our own em-
pirical test of this hypothesis has supported it (see Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2006b: 141–146). 
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nation of why, throughout most of human history, the world population fol-
lowed the hyperbolic pattern with the absolute population growth rate tending 
to be proportional to N2. For example, why would the growth of population 
from, say, 10 million to 100 million, result in the growth of dN/dt 100 times? 
The above mentioned models explain this rather convincingly. The point is that 
the growth of world population from 10 to 100 million implies that human sub-
sistence technologies also grew approximately 10 times (given that it will have 
proven, after all, to be able to support a population ten times larger). On the 
other hand, the tenfold population growth also implies a tenfold growth in the 
number of potential inventors, and, hence, a tenfold increase in the relative 
technological growth rate. Thus, the absolute technological growth rate would 
expand 10 × 10 = 100 times as, in accordance with Eq. 4, an order of magnitude 
higher number of people having at their disposal an order of magnitude wider 
technological base would tend to make two orders of magnitude more inven-
tions. If, as throughout the Malthusian epoch, the world population (N) tended 
toward the technologically determined carrying capacity of the Earth, we have 
good reason to expect that dN/dt should also grow just by about 100 times. 
In fact, it can be shown (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2006a, 2006b; 
Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006) that the hyperbolic pattern of the world's popu-
lation growth could be accounted for by a nonlinear second-order positive feed-
back mechanism that was long ago shown to generate just the hyperbolic growth, 
also known as the ‘blow-up regime’ (see, e.g., Kurdyumov 1999). In our case, 
this nonlinear second-order positive feedback looks as follows: more people – 
more potential inventors – faster technological growth – faster growth of the 
Earth's carrying capacity – faster population growth – more people allow for 
more potential inventors – faster technological growth, and so on (see Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3. Cognitive scheme of the nonlinear second order positive feed-
back between technological development and demographic 
growth 
Note that the relationship between technological development and demographic 
growth cannot be analyzed through any simple cause-and-effect model, as we 
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observe a true dynamic relationship between these two processes – each of 
them is both the cause and the effect of the other. 
The feedback system described here should be identified with the process 
of ‘collective learning’ described, principally, by Christian (2005: 146–148). 
The mathematical models of World System development discussed in this arti-
cle can be interpreted as models of the influence that collective learning has on 
global social evolution (i.e., the evolution of the World System). Thus, the ra-
ther peculiar hyperbolic shape of accelerated global development prior to the 
early 1970s may be regarded as a product of global collective learning. We 
have also shown (Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2006a: 34–66) that, for the period 
prior to the 1970s, World System economic and demographic macrodynamics, 
driven by the above-mentioned positive feedback loops, can simply and accu-
rately be described with the following model: 
,aSN
dt
dN                                               (Eq. 5) 
.bNS
dt
dS                                                (Eq. 6) 
The world GDP (G) can be calculated using the following equation: 
G = mN + SN, (Eq. 7)
where G is the world GDP, N is population, and S is the produced surplus per 
capita, over the subsistence amount (m) that is minimally necessary to repro-
duce the population with a zero growth rate in a Malthusian system (thus,  
S = g – m, where g denotes per capita GDP); a and b are parameters. 
The mathematical analysis of the basic model (not described here) suggests 
that up to the 1970s, the amount of S should be proportional, in the long run, to 
the World System's population: S = kN. Our statistical analysis of available 
empirical data has confirmed this theoretical proportionality (Korotayev, 
Malkov et al. 2006a: 49–50). Thus, in the right-hand side of Eq. 6, S can be 
replaced with kN, resulting in the following equation: 
2kaN
dt
dN  . 
Recall that the solution of this type of differential equations is: 
)( 0 tt
CN t  , 
which produces a simple hyperbolic curve. 
As, according to our model, S can be approximated as kN, its long-term 
dynamics can be approximated with the following equation: 
  tt
kCS  0 .                                          (Eq. 8) 
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Thus, the long-term dynamics of the most dynamic component of the 




kCSN  . (Eq. 9)
This suggests that the long-term world GDP dynamics up to the early 
1970s must be approximated better by a quadratic hyperbola, rather than by 
a simple one. As shown in Fig. 4, this approximation works very effectively 
indeed. 
 
Fig. 4. The fit between predictions of a quadratic-hyperbolic model 
and observed world GDP dynamics, 1–1973 CE (in billions of 
1990 international dollars, PPP)  
Note: R = .9993, R2 = .9986, p << .0001. The black markers correspond to Maddison's 
(2001) estimates (Maddison's estimates of the world per capita GDP for 1000 CE 
has been corrected on the basis of [Meliantsev 2004]). The grey solid line has 






Thus, up to the 1970s the hyperbolic growth of the world population was ac-
companied by the quadratic-hyperbolic growth of the world GDP, as suggested 
by our model. Note that the hyperbolic growth of the world population and the 
quadratic-hyperbolic growth of the world GDP are very tightly connected proc-
esses, actually two sides of the same coin, two dimensions of one process pro-
pelled by nonlinear second-order positive feedback loops between the techno-
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Fig. 5. Cognitive scheme of the world economic growth generated by 
nonlinear second-order positive feedback between technologi-
cal development and demographic growth 
We have also demonstrated (Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2006a: 67–80) that the 
World System population's literacy (l) dynamics are rather accurately described 
by the following differential equation: 
                                      ),1( laSldt
dl   (Eq. 10) 
where l is the proportion of the population that is literate, S is per capita sur-
plus, and a is a constant. In fact, this is a version of the autocatalytic model. 
Literacy growth is proportional to the fraction of the population that is literate,  
l (potential teachers), to the fraction of the population that is illiterate, (1 – l) 
(potential pupils), and to the amount of per capita surplus S, since it can be used 
to support educational programs. (Additionally, S reflects the technological 
level T that implies, among other things, the level of development of educa-
tional technologies.) From a mathematical point of view, Eq. 9 can be regarded 
as logistic where saturation is reached at literacy level l = 1. S is responsible for 
the speed with which this level is being approached. 
It is important to stress that with low values of l (which correspond to 
most of human history, with recent decades being the exception), the rate of 
increase in world literacy generated by this model (against the background 
of hyperbolic growth of S) can be approximated rather accurately as hyper-
bolic (see Fig. 6). 
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Fig. 6. The fit between predictions of the hyperbolic model and ob-
served world literacy dynamics, 1–1980 CE (%%) 
Note: R = 0.997, R2 = 0.994, p << 0.0001. Black dots correspond to World Bank (2013) 
estimates for the period since 1970, and to Meliantsev's (2004) estimates for the 




lt  . 
The best-fit values of parameters С (3769.264) and t0 (2040) have been calculated 
with the least squares method. 
The overall number of literate people is proportional both to the literacy level 
and to the overall population. As both of these variables experienced hyperbolic 
growth until the 1960s/1970s, one has sufficient grounds to expect that until 
recently the overall number of literate people in the world (L)8 was growing not 
just hyperbolically, but rather in a quadratic-hyperbolic way (as was world 
GDP). Our empirical test has confirmed this – the quadratic-hyperbolic model 
describes the growth of the literate population of this planet with an extremely 
good fit indeed (see Fig. 7). 
                                                          
8 Since literacy appeared, almost all of the Earth's literate population has lived within the World 
System; hence, the literate population of the Earth and the literate population of the World System 
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Fig. 7. The fit between predictions of the quadratic-hyperbolic model 
and observed world literate population dynamics, 1–1980 CE 
(L, millions) 
Note: R = 0.9997, R2 = 0.9994, p << 0.0001. The black dots correspond to 
UNESCO/World Bank (2014) estimates for the period since 1970, and to Meli-
antsev's (2004) estimates for the earlier period; we have also taken into account 
the changes of age structure on the basis of UN Population Division (2014) data. 






The best-fit values of parameters С (4958551) and t0 (2033) have been calculated 
with the least squares method. 
Similar processes are observed with respect to world urbanization, the macro-
dynamics of which appear to be described by the differential equation: 
)( lim uubSudt
du  ,                               (Eq. 11) 
where u is the proportion of the population that is urban, S is per capita surplus 
produced with the given level of the World System's technological develop-
ment, b is a constant, and ulim is the maximum possible proportion of the popu-
lation that can be urban. Note that this model implies that during the Malthu-
sian-Kuznetsian era of the blow-up regime, the hyperbolic growth of world 
urbanization must have been accompanied by a quadratic-hyperbolic growth  
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Fig. 8. The fit between predictions of the hyperbolic model and em-
pirical estimates of world megaurbanization dynamics (% of 
the world population living in cities with > 250,000 inhabi-
tants), 10,000 BCE – 1960 CE 
Note: R = 0.987, R2 = 0.974, p << 0.0001. The black dots correspond to Chandler's 
(1987) estimates, UN Population Division (2014), Modelski (2003), and Gruebler 






The best-fit values of parameters С (403.012) and t0 (1990) have been calculated 
with the least squares method. For comparison, the best fit (R2) obtained here for 
the exponential model is 0.492. 
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Fig. 9. The fit between predictions of the quadratic-hyperbolic model 
and the observed dynamics of world urban population living in 
cities with > 250,000 inhabitants (millions), 10,000 BCE – 
1960 CE 
Note: R = 0.998, R2 = 0.996, p << 0.0001. The black markers correspond to estimates of 
Chandler (1987) and UN Population Division (2014). The grey solid line has been 






The best-fit values of parameters С (912057.9) and t0 (2008) have been calculated 
with the least squares method. For comparison, the best fit (R2) obtained here for 
the exponential model is 0.637. 
Within this context it is hardly surprising to find that the general macrodynam-
ics of largest settlements within the World System are also quadratic-
hyperbolic (see Fig. 10). 
As has been demonstrated by socio-cultural anthropologists working across 
cultures (see, e.g., Naroll and Divale 1976; Levinson and Malone 1980: 34), for 
pre-agrarian, agrarian, and early industrial cultures the size of the largest set-
tlement is a rather effective indicator of the general sociocultural complexity of 
a social system. This, of course, suggests that the World System's general so-
ciocultural complexity also grew, in the Malthusian-Kuznetsian era, in a gener-
ally quadratic-hyperbolic way. 
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Fig. 10. The fit between predictions of the quadratic-hyperbolic model 
and the observed dynamics of size of the largest settlement of 
the world (thousands of inhabitants), 10,000 BCE – 1950 CE 
Note: R = 0.992, R2 = 0.984, p << 0.0001. The black markers correspond to estimates of 
Modelski (2003) and Chandler (1987). The grey solid line has been generated by 






The best-fit values of parameters С (104020618.5) and t0 (2040) have been calcu-
lated with the least squares method. For comparison, the best fit (R2) obtained here 
for the exponential model is 0.747. 
Turning to a more concrete case study, as suggested at the beginning of this 
section, the hyperbolic model is particularly effective for describing the long-
term population dynamics of China, the country with the best-known demo-
graphic history. The Chinese population curve reflects not only a hyperbolic 
trend, but also cyclical and stochastic dynamics. These components of long-
term population dynamics in China, as well as in other complex agrarian socie-
ties, have been discussed extensively (see, e.g., Braudel 1973; Abel 1980; Ush-
er 1989; Goldstone 1991; Chu and Lee 1994; Komlos and Nefedov 2002; Tur-
chin 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Nefedov 2004; Korotayev 2006; Korotayev and 
Khaltourina 2006; Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2006b; Turchin and Korotayev 
2006; Korotayev, Komarova et al. 2007; Grinin, Korotayev et al. 2008; Grinin, 
Malkov et al. 2009; Turchin and Nefedov 2009; van Kessel-Hagesteijn 2009; 
Korotayev, Khaltourina, Malkov et al. 2010; Korotayev, Khaltourina et al. 
2010; Grinin and Korotayev 2012). 
As we have observed with respect to world population dynamics, even  
before the start of its intensive modernization, the population dynamics of 
China were characterized by a pronounced hyperbolic trend (Figs 11 and 12).  
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The hyperbolic model describes traditional Chinese population dynamics much 
more accurately than either linear or exponential models. 
 
Fig. 11. Population dynamics of China (million people, following Koro-
tayev, Malkov et al. 2006b: 47–88), 57–1851 CE. Fit with 
Linear and Exponential Models  
Note: Linear model: R2 = 0.469. Exponential model: R2 = 0.600. 
 
Fig. 12. Fit between a hyperbolic model and observed population dy-
namics of China (million people), 57–1851 CE 
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The hyperbolic model describes the population dynamics of China in an espe-
cially accurate way if we take the modern period into account (Fig. 13). 
 
Fig. 13. Fit between a hyperbolic model and observed population dy-
namics of China (million people, following Korotayev, Malkov 
et al. 2006b: 47–88), 57–2003 CE 




It is curious that, as we noted above, the dynamics of marine biodiversity are 
strikingly similar to the population dynamics of China. The similarity probably 
derives from the fact that both curves are produced by the interference of the 
same three components (the general hyperbolic trend, as well as cyclical and 
stochastic dynamics). In fact, there is a lot of evidence that some aspects of 
biodiversity dynamics are stochastic (Raup et al. 1973; Sepkoski 1994; Markov 
2001; Cornette and Lieberman 2004), while others are periodic (Raup and Sep-
koski 1984; Rohde and Muller 2005). In any event, the hyperbolic model de-
scribes marine biodiversity (measured by number of genera) through the Phan-
erozoic much more accurately than an exponential model (Fig. 14). 
When measured by number of species, the fit between the empirically ob-
served marine biodiversity dynamics and the hyperbolic model becomes even 
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Fig. 14. Global change in marine biodiversity (number of genera, N) 
through the Phanerozoic (following Markov and Korotayev 2007)  
Note: Exponential model: R2 = 0.463. Hyperbolic model: R2 = 0.854. The hyperbolic 





Fig. 15. Global change in marine biodiversity (number of species, N) 
through the Phanerozoic (following Markov and Korotayev 2008)  
Note: Exponential model: R2 = 0.51. Hyperbolic model: R2 = 0.91. The hyperbolic line 





Likewise, the hyperbolic model describes continental biodiversity in an espe-
cially accurate way (Fig. 16).  
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Fig. 16. Global change in continental biodiversity (number of genera, 
N) through the Phanerozoic (following Markov and Korotayev 
2008)  
Note: Exponential model: R2 = 0.86. Hyperbolic model: R2 = 0.94. The hyperbolic line 




However, the best fit between the hyperbolic model and the empirical data is 
observed when the hyperbolic model is used to describe the dynamics of total 
(marine and continental) global biodiversity (Fig. 17). 
 
Fig. 17. Global change in total biodiversity (number of genera, N) through 
the Phanerozoic (following Markov and Korotayev 2008)  
Note: Exponential model: R2 = 0.67. Hyperbolic model: R2 = 0.95. The hyperbolic line 
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The hyperbolic dynamics are most prominent when both marine and continen-
tal biotas are considered together. This fact can be interpreted as a proof of the 
integrated nature of the biosphere. But why, throughout the Phanerozoic, did 
global biodiversity tend to follow a hyperbolic trend similar to that which we 
observed for the World System in general and China in particular? 
As we have noted above, in sociological models of macrohistorical dynam-
ics, the hyperbolic pattern of world population growth arises from non-linear 
second-order positive feedback (more or less identical with the mechanism of 
collective learning) between demographic growth and technological develop-
ment. Based on analogy with these sociological models and diverse paleon-
tological data, we suggest that the hyperbolic character of biodiversity growth 
can be similarly accounted for by non-linear second-order positive feedback 
between diversity growth and the complexity of community structure: more 
genera – higher alpha diversity – enhanced stability and ‘buffering’ of commu-
nities – lengthening of average life span of genera, accompanied by a decrease 
in the extinction rate – faster diversity growth – more genera – higher alpha 
diversity, and so on. Indeed, this begins to appear as a (rather imperfect) ana-
logue of the collective learning mechanism active in social macroevolution.  
The growth of genus richness throughout the Phanerozoic was mainly due 
to an increase in the average longevity of genera and a gradual accumulation of 
long-lived (stable) genera in the biota. This pattern reveals itself in a decrease 
in the extinction rate. Interestingly, in both biota and humanity, growth was 
facilitated by a decrease in mortality rather than by an increase in the birth rate. 
The longevity of newly arising genera was growing in a stepwise manner. 
The most short-lived genera appeared during the Cambrian; more long-lived 
genera appeared in Ordovician to Permian; the next two stages correspond to 
the Mesozoic and Cenozoic (Markov 2001, 2002). We suggest that diversity 
growth can facilitate the increase in genus longevity via progressive stepwise 
changes in the structure of communities. 
Most authors agree that three major biotic changes resulted in the funda-
mental reorganization of community structure during the Phanerozoic: Ordovi-
cian radiation, end-Permian extinction, and end-Cretaceous extinction (Bam-
bach 1977; Sepkoski et al. 1981; Sepkoski 1988, 1992; Markov 2001; Bambach 
et al. 2002). Generally, after each major crisis, the communities became more 
complex, diverse, and stable. The stepwise increase of alpha diversity (i.e., the 
average number of species or genera in a community) through the Phanerozoic 
was demonstrated by Bambach (1977) and Sepkoski (1988). Although Powell 
and Kowalewski (2002) have argued that the observed increase in alpha diver-
sity might be an artifact caused by several specific biases that influenced the 
taxonomic richness of different parts of the fossil record, there is evidence that 
these biases largely compensated for one another so that the observed increase 
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in alpha diversity was probably underestimated rather than overestimated (Bush 
and Bambach 2004). 
Another important symptom of progressive development of communities is 
an increase in the evenness of species (or genus) abundance distribution. In 
primitive, pioneer, or suppressed communities, this distribution is strongly un-
even: the community is overwhelmingly dominated by a few very abundant 
species. In more advanced, climax, or flourishing communities, this distribution 
is more even (Magurran 1988). The former type of community is generally 
more vulnerable. The evenness of species richness distribution in communities 
increased substantially during the Phanerozoic (Powell and Kowalewski 2002; 
Bush and Bambach 2004). It is most likely there was also an increase in habitat 
utilization, total biomass, and the rate of trophic flow in biota through the 
Phanerozoic (Powell and Kowalewski 2002). 
The more complex the community, the more stable it is due to the devel-
opment of effective interspecies interactions and homeostatic mechanisms 
based on the negative feedback principle. In a complex community, when the 
abundance of a species decreases, many factors arise that facilitate its recovery 
(e.g., food resources rebound while predator populations decline). Even if the 
species becomes extinct, its vacant niche may ‘recruit’ another species, most 
probably a related one that may acquire morphological similarity with its pre-
decessor and thus will be assigned to the same genus by taxonomists. So 
a complex community can facilitate the stability (and longevity) of its compo-
nents, such as niches, taxa and morphotypes. This effect reveals itself in the 
phenomenon of ‘coordinated stasis’. The fossil record contains many examples 
in which particular communities persist for million years while the rates of ex-
tinction and taxonomic turnover are minimized (Brett et al. 1996, 2007). 
Selective extinction leads to the accumulation of ‘extinction-tolerant’ taxa 
in the biota (Sepkoski 1991b). Although there is evidence that mass extinctions 
can be nonselective in some aspects (Jablonski 2005), they are obviously highly 
selective with respect to the ability of taxa to endure unpredictable environ-
mental changes. This can be seen, for instance, in the selectivity of the end-
Cretaceous mass extinction with respect to the time of the first occurrence of 
genera. In younger cohorts, the extinction level was higher than that of the old-
er cohorts (see Markov and Korotayev 2007: fig. 2). The same pattern can be 
observed during the periods of ‘background’ extinction as well. This means that 
genera differ in their ability to survive extinction events, and that extinction-
tolerant genera accumulate in each cohort over the course of time. Thus, taxa 
generally become more stable and long-lived through the course of evolution, 
apart from the effects of communities. The communities composed of more 
stable taxa would be, in turn, more stable themselves, thus creating positive 
feedback. 
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The stepwise change of dominant taxa plays a major role in biotic evolu-
tion. This pattern is maintained not only by the selectivity of extinction (dis-
cussed above), but also by the selectivity of the recovery after crises (Bambach 
et al. 2002). The taxonomic structure of the Phanerozoic biota was changing in 
a stepwise way, as demonstrated by the concept of three sequential ‘evolution-
ary faunas’ (Sepkoski 1992). There were also stepwise changes in the propor-
tion of major groups of animals with different ecological and physiological 
parameters. There was stepwise growth in the proportion of motile genera to 
non-motile, ‘physiologically buffered’ genera to ‘unbuffered’, and predators to 
prey (Bambach et al. 2002). All these trends should have facilitated the stability 
of communities. For example, the diversification of predators implies that they 
became more specialized. A specialized predator regulates its prey's abundance 
more effectively than a non-specialized predator. 
There is also another possible mechanism of second-order positive feed-
back between diversity and its growth rate. Recent research has demonstrated 
a shift in typical relative-abundance distributions in paleocommunities after the 
Paleozoic (Wagner et al. 2006). One possible interpretation of this shift is that 
community structure and the interactions between species in the communities 
became more complex. In post-Paleozoic communities, new species probably 
increased ecospace more efficiently, either by facilitating opportunities for ad-
ditional species or by niche construction (Wagner et al. 2006; Solé et al. 2002; 
Laland et al. 1999). This possibility makes the mechanisms underlying the hy-
perbolic growth of biodiversity and human population even more similar, be-
cause the total ecospace of the biota is analogous to the ‘carrying capacity of 
the Earth’ in demography. As far as new species can increase ecospace and 
facilitate opportunities for additional species entering the community, they are 
analogous to the ‘inventors’ of the demographic models whose inventions in-
crease the carrying capacity of the Earth. 
Exponential and logistic models of biodiversity imply several possible 
ways in which the rates of origination and extinction may change through time 
(Sepkoski 1991a). For instance, exponential growth can be derived from con-
stant per-taxon extinction and origination rates, the latter being higher than the 
former. However, actual paleontological data suggest that origination and ex-
tinction rates did not follow any distinct trend through the Phanerozoic, and 
their changes through time look very much like chaotic fluctuations (Cornette 
and Lieberman 2004). Therefore, it is more difficult to find a simple mathe-
matical approximation for the origination and extinction rates than for the total 
diversity. In fact, the only critical requirement of the exponential model is that 
the difference between the origination and extinction through time should be 
proportional to the current diversity level: 
(No −Ne)/Δt ≈ kN,                                   (Eq. 12) 
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where No and Ne are the numbers of genera with, respectively, first and last 
occurrences within the time interval Δt, and N is the mean diversity level during 
the interval. The same is true for the hyperbolic model. It does not predict the 
exact way in which origination and extinction should change, but it does predict 
that their difference should be roughly proportional to the square of the current 
diversity level: 
(No −Ne)/Δt ≈ kN2.                                 (Eq. 13)  
In the demographic models discussed above, the hyperbolic growth of the 
world population was not decomposed into separate trends of birth and death 
rates. The main driving force of this growth was presumably an increase in the 
carrying capacity of the Earth. The way in which this capacity was realized – 
either by decreasing death rate or by increasing birth rate, or both – depended 
upon many factors and may varied from time to time. 
The same is probably true for biodiversity. The overall shape of the diver-
sity curve depends mostly on the differences in the mean rates of diversity 
growth in the Paleozoic (low), Mesozoic (moderate), and Cenozoic (high). 
The Mesozoic increase was mainly due to a lower extinction rate (compared to 
the Paleozoic), while the Cenozoic increase was largely due to a higher origina-
tion rate (compared to the Mesozoic) (see Markov and Korotayev 2007: 316, 
fig. 3a and b). This probably means that the acceleration of diversity growth 
during the last two eras was driven by different mechanisms of positive feed-
back between diversity and its growth rate. Generally, the increment rate  
((No −Ne)/Δt) was changing in a more regular way than the origination rate 
No/Δt and extinction rate Ne/Δt. The large-scale changes in the increment  
rate correlate better with N2 than with N (see Markov and Korotayev 2007: 316, 
fig. 3c and d), thus supporting the hyperbolic rather than the exponential model. 
Conclusion 
In mathematical models of historical macrodynamics, a hyperbolic pattern of 
world population growth arises from non-linear second-order positive feedback 
between the demographic growth and technological development. Based on the 
analogy with macrosociological models and diverse paleontological data, we 
suggest that the hyperbolic character of biodiversity growth can be similarly 
accounted for by non-linear second-order positive feedback between the diver-
sity growth and the complexity of community structure. This hints at the pres-
ence, within the biosphere, of a certain analogue to the collective learning 
mechanism. The feedback can work via two parallel mechanisms: (1) a de-
creasing extinction rate (more surviving taxa – higher alpha diversity – com-
munities become more complex and stable – extinction rate decreases – more 
taxa, and so on), and (2) an increasing origination rate (new taxa – niche con-
struction – newly formed niches occupied by the next ‘generation’ of taxa – 
new taxa, and so on). The latter possibility makes the mechanisms underlying 
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the hyperbolic growth of biodiversity and human population even more similar, 
because the total ecospace of the biota is analogous to the ‘carrying capacity of 
the Earth’ in demography. As far as new species can increase ecospace and 
facilitate opportunities for additional species entering the community, they are 
analogous to the ‘inventors’ of the demographic models whose inventions in-
crease the carrying capacity of the Earth. 
The hyperbolic growth of Phanerozoic biodiversity suggests that ‘coopera-
tive’ interactions between taxa can play an important role in evolution, along 
with generally accepted competitive interactions. Due to this ‘cooperation’ 
(which may be roughly analogous to ‘collective learning’), the evolution of 
biodiversity acquires some features of a self-accelerating process. The same is 
naturally true of cooperation/collective learning in global social evolution. This 
analysis suggests that we can trace rather similar macropatterns within both the 
biological and social phases of Big History. These macropatterns can be repre-
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